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Abstract: Michael Brown famously asked ‘Who owns native culture?’ This
paper revisits that question by analyzing what happens to culture when the
culturally defined boundary between it and nature becomes salient in the
context of disputes between indigenous and settler populations. My case
study is the dispute between the New Zealand government and Maori
tribal groupings concerning ownership of the foreshore and seabed. Having
been granted the right to test their claims in court in 2003, Maori groups
were enraged when the government legislated the right out of existence in
2004. Though the reasons for doing so were clearly political, contrasting
cultural assumptions appeared to set Maori and Pakeha (New Zealanders
of European origin) at odds. While couching ownership of part of nature
as an IPR issue may seem counter-intuitive, I argue that as soon as a property
claim destabilizes the nature/culture boundary, IPR discourse becomes
pertinent.
INTRODUCTION
The question of who owns native nature seems like a different sort of question
than who owns native culture. In this article I attempt to understand whether this
intuition stands up to scrutiny and how it may be linked to a set of cultural as-
sumptions that may or may not be shared with others.
In the process I examine the old anthropological adage that people of different
cultural backgrounds delimit the boundary between nature and culture differ-
ently. For certain actors this means even explicitly denying the boundary alto-
gether, a strategy pursued by some indigenous legal activists,1 but usually by
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instituting equally powerful distinctions, or more implicit versions of the nature/
culture boundary, elsewhere. In any event where, how, and whether people draw
and redraw the boundary has implications (and here I cite a few references solely
from anthropology) not just for how they treat the environment in general2 but
also for how they treat other animal species,3 humans of other races,4 and mem-
bers of the opposite gender.5
If it is true that people of different cultural backgrounds delimit the boundary
between nature and culture differently, how does that shape and complicate a
number of issues that are the focus of continued and vexed debate in New Zea-
land? Not surprisingly, most issues arise in the context of relations between the
two most important and allegedly culturally distinct populations of Ma¯ori and
Pa¯keha¯, the latter a contested label for whites or people of European descent.6 I
cannot address all such issues here, but I include two that would be worthy con-
tenders if I had more space. The first is an ongoing claim to the intellectual
property surrounding some iconic plant and animal species, lodged before the
Treaty of Waitangi Tribunal (WAI 262).7 However, for reasons that have precisely
to do with disagreements over the nature/culture boundary, proponents of the
claim argue that intellectual property is something of a misnomer, preferring the
broader phrase cultural and intellectual heritage rights or the Ma¯ori term taonga
(see the following text). The second issue has to do with the question of Ma¯ori
opposition to certain kinds of genetic research and modification or engineering
in the fields of medicine and agricultural production.8 The claims here have more
to do with rights to veto the inappropriate mixing of genetic constitutions and
genealogies (whakapapa).
Although each issue would clearly lend itself to the kind of interrogation pre-
viously outlined, my topic may strike readers as needing more justification. As far
as I know, it has never been couched as an issue of intellectual property rights
(IPRs), and doing so may seem like a category error. Nevertheless, as soon as a
property claim destabilizes the nature/culture boundary, the possibility of using
IPR discourse enters the fray.
The main case study on which I draw to illustrate these questions, then, is the
so-called foreshore and seabed dispute in New Zealand, which has led to the polit-
icization of both culture and nature and so is a matter of continuing ideological
debate. But it also suits my analytical purposes well. This contention is supported
by arguments proposed for Melanesian cultures by Marilyn Strathern9 and Andrew
Moutu.10 In the Melanesian context, land can be conceived of as a kind of intel-
lectual property. In fact, it turns out that real and intellectual properties may not
be as distinct in the Western context as most commentators, including Strathern,
assume.
As in some of my previous attempts to grapple with questions surrounding
cultural identity in New Zealand,11 I start from an anthropological axiom of cul-
tural symmetry. That means everyone takes part in culture, has culture, and is
cultural to the same extent. But I am aware that not everyone in New Zealand
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sees things that way, which affects how they take part in culture. They sometimes
do so, for example, on the basis of what I regard as the misguided assumption of
cultural asymmetry, which shapes political debates and underpins the policies of
many governmental and nongovernmental bodies. I also recognize that the un-
derlying cultural symmetry may coexist with political inequality, as in the op-
pression and marginalization of indigenous peoples. Nevertheless, I do not see
how a truly anthropological analysis can subscribe au fond to the view that some
actors are more cultural than others. For this reason, I believe anthropology can
provide a useful perspective on debates in New Zealand cultural politics, even if
anthropological perspectives do not lend themselves to easy black-and-white
solutions.
THE CULTURE OF NATURE
The title of this article plays with the now-famous phrase that forms the title of
Michael Brown’s important and influential book12 on issues of culture and own-
ership: Who owns native culture? However, I am not simply borrowing his for-
mulation to direct attention to a different sphere and add to the debate by extending
the reach of his argument. I ask a different question and effectively question his
question. If one replaces culture in his question with nature, interesting things hap-
pen to culture.
To start with, my title’s rephrased question verges on the rhetorical or the re-
dundant. Who owns native nature intuitively sounds more straightforward to my
ears than who owns native culture, because if nature is native, surely—as the ques-
tion already assumes—it is by definition already owned by natives. It’s like asking
the apparently tautological question, Who owns my house? The immediate pre-
sumption is that I own my house. True, the reality could turn out to be more
complex: The answer could be me plus my partner, my spouse, my parents, my land-
lord, my bank, the state, and so forth. But even if I do not actually or wholly own
my house, there will be little doubt that the house is, firstly, owned in some iden-
tifiable way and, secondly, owned by some person or persons identifiable in law,
either in their own right, acting as agents for others, or represented by institu-
tions. To paraphrase Honoré,13 ownership can be regarded simply as the greatest
possible interest in a thing whose ownership is legally recognized. In my world,
which is strongly influenced by the Anglo-American and European legal tradition,
finding out who owns a house thus becomes a matter for empirical, rather than
philosophical, investigation.
Part of what I am trying to do here, however, is to work out why the question
of the ownership of cultural and intellectual property is not usually treated as
similarly clear-cut in principle. To put it another way, one has to ask why an-
thropologists, legislators, and IPR consultants have not generally deemed Brown’s
question to be rhetorical (in the sense of superfluous because the answer is sup-
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posedly obvious). It may have to do with the fact that culture, in the broadest
anthropological sense, has not been treated as property by Western legal regimes,
unlike almost everything else. Indeed, there is a relentless logic at work that seems
bent on bringing more and more of the material world under property regimes
(e.g., potable water, deep-water fish species, and carbon credits). Those parts of
the material world that have (so far) been excluded from ownership claims (e.g.,
international waters, Antarctica, and outer space) may either become subject to
such claims or must continue to be explicitly excluded from such considerations
by international treaties and conventions, thus confirming the point. True, bits
of culture are classifiable as property—under copyright and patent provisions,
for example—but the broader question of who owns Western culture does not
offer as much purchase as who owns native culture. The latter seems like a ques-
tion arising from the necessity of having to rethink cultural property in the face
of claims to rights in cultures as wholes, stemming from indigenous challenges
to Western property law. One interesting consequence may be that who owns
Western culture will become a much more conceivable and feasible question in
the future, but first it must lose its unmarked character vis-à-vis the culture of
indigenous minorities. In the absence of a major world-historical political change,
I consider that unlikely.
That I find the question of ownership complicated when transferred from one
domain to another has to do with a widespread assumption concerning the dif-
ferent ontological (or even the epistemological) status of culture as compared to
nature. On this view culture, like all knowledge, can be owned by more than one
person or by no identifiable person at all; and it is not a thing in the same way as
nature or material things. Nature must always have a material basis, at least ac-
cording to common sense. Here, nature refers to things that have a material exis-
tence, including segments of the natural environment, concrete objects (whether
natural or produced by cultural action), and aspects of people’s own biological
being, such as their bodies, body parts, and genetic constitution.
If we assume that nature and culture have different ontological statuses and
are therefore subject to somewhat different ownership claims, we could argue
that culture preeminently concerns claims via the politics of recognition, whereas
nature preeminently concerns claims via the politics of redistribution.14 The first
kind of politics assumes that everyone deserves respect and recognition on the
non-zero sum basis of group membership of some sort; the latter approach, by
contrast, assumes that not everyone can muster equal ownership claims and is
therefore predicated on zero sum logic. To put it another way, culture as a trans-
ferable good is not inherently diminished, in any strict sense, by being appropri-
ated by others, whereas nature as the material world is inherently limited. As has
often been noted in relation to real estate, no one is making any more of it,
whereas the domain of culture is ceaselessly invented and inventive. For just this
reason, incidentally, the logic of joint stewardship, which is Brown’s proposed
solution15 to conundrums of cultural ownership, may not convince indigenous
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peoples working in partnership with nonindigenous others to resolve disputes
over the ownership of nature (especially land). After all, why would indigenous
groups voluntarily concede to the theft of some or all the property that they
already (believe they) own?
Yet one complicating factor in setting out my argument is precisely the diffi-
culty of maintaining a clear separation between nature and culture in specific cases,
a difficulty shared by most New Zealanders, Ma¯ori and non-Ma¯ori alike. Even if
New Zealanders talk as though the distinction is clear, it tends to collapse or at
least to blur in practice. As a consequence, conflicts over intellectual (or, as I pre-
fer, cultural) property inevitably generate questions concerning material (or nat-
ural) property—and vice versa.
The boundary between nature and culture is therefore always problematic. If
nature has a cultural dimension to it, such a distinction will never be entirely clear-
cut: Bodies, landscapes, and material objects are culturally shaped. Individual cul-
tures draw the boundary differently, and their rhetorical justifications for doing so
are always, by definition, cultural. Moreover, one of those cultural/rhetorical strat-
egies may be to argue that certain cultures do not maintain such a separation, that
to maintain one is itself a sign of alienation from nature. The argument has an
even deeper resonance in some circles. This notion of the interpenetrability (or
even inseparability) of nature and culture is in fact crucial to many nativist dis-
courses of ownership. It should come as no surprise, therefore, that such notions
arise in the discourse surrounding the Treaty of Waitangi in New Zealand. This is
not the place for an extended history of the treaty and the evolution of accompa-
nying claims and settlement processes, but a quick sketch may be in order for
some readers.
The treaty was signed in February 1840 as an instrument to construct an or-
derly relationship between the British Crown and Ma¯ori leaders, guaranteeing
Ma¯ori the status of British subjects and the continued possession of their prop-
erty while getting them to concede sovereignty (or something less than sover-
eignty) to the Crown. This last point is most contentious, because the English
version of the treaty document uses the term sovereignty, whereas the Ma¯ori treaty
uses a missionary-inspired neologism kawanatanga (literally governorhood), which
many Ma¯ori negotiators argue is a much more circumscribed notion. This view
of that part of the treaty is supported by some lawyers, historians, and constitu-
tional experts and disputed by others. Clearly, for much of the nineteenth cen-
tury and the first half of the twentieth century, the British and successor New
Zealand governments assumed that sovereignty had been ceded to the Crown, an
interpretation that underpinned British settlement and land alienation, in addi-
tion to justifying military action when Ma¯ori resisted. Although indigenous pro-
test never died away entirely, it was not until the Ma¯ori renaissance of the 1960s
and 1970s that a reassessment of the treaty gained much traction. In response,
the Waitangi Tribunal was set up in 1975 to investigate ongoing claims and in-
justices (i.e., issues arising from that point onward). A decade later, in a move of
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great historical significance, the tribunal’s purview was retrospectively expanded
to include claims going back to the date of the treaty’s signing. The tribunal
cannot compel the government to act in any way, but it has the power to re-
search historical findings and to make recommendations that have varying de-
grees of force. Under its aegis some major claims have been settled, at least for
the interim, but many remain and controversy clouds some that have been nom-
inally resolved.16
To return to my main argument, in the stated view of some Ma¯ori, land and
material objects (whether culturally produced or not) are canonically said to have
wairua or spirituality, to not be exclusively natural in the way that Western science
supposedly assumes.17 This conflation of natural and cultural may be intensified
by the designation of goods that fall into each category as taonga. Translated most
frequently as treasures or valuables, taonga consist of an open-ended series of goods,
the rights to which are guaranteed under article 2 of the Treaty of Waitangi but
the definitions of which are open to debate. Because claims adjudicated on inWait-
angi Tribunal judgments have applied to taonga as diverse as lands, fisheries, and
the Ma¯ori language itself, the referents of the term clearly include both material
and cultural or intellectual property.
The issue becomes even more complex when cultural and linguistic phenom-
ena come into play. For example, ownership claims in Ma¯ori and other Polynesian
languages are inflected by an inherent distinction between possessive articles that
imply either alienability or inalienability (the well known a versus o opposition).
To say that something is mine or ours may therefore imply something other than
straightforward ownership in the Western sense.
In addition, the fact that some claims to both cultural and natural property
have a perduring quality may stem from quite different logics of ownership (at
least as expressed in legal argument). On this view, indigenous cultural property is
owned in perpetuity because it is owned not by individuals but, as Brown18 de-
scribes, by groups that in principle could live forever (thereby circumventing the
time-limited provisions of patent and copyright regimes). Indigenous natural prop-
erty, by contrast, is ultimately owned in perpetuity—like everyone else’s—because
if it is subject to a claim for return or redress, it can only be because the property
was earlier alienated by force or fraud and not because of some presumed differ-
ence in the legal status of the owner. If (and this is a big if) it was not alienated in
those ways, it unequivocally belongs to some other party, not to indigenous peo-
ple organized in traditional ways. In principle, therefore, Western law is perfectly
compatible with both indigenous and nonindigenous claims to nature in perpe-
tuity, even if in practice that principle has often been ignored or manipulated when
it comes to indigenous minorities in settler societies.
The nature/culture distinction tends to blur at precisely this point, however.
One cultural difference between capitalist and noncapitalist notions of property is
that the latter sets no time limit (or perhaps it sets indefinitely long time limits)
on the ownership of culture. Western capitalist regimes, by contrast, allow such
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longevity only in the case of nature: One owns land or material property unless
and until it is alienated. Intellectual/cultural property is a different matter. It is
time delimited, often in some formulaic proportion calibrated to the lifespan of
the owner. One might say that the individualistic nature of such ownership is em-
bodied, a point derived from C.B. Macpherson’s analysis of the rise of possessive
individualism.19 This work treats as historically pivotal the development of a mod-
ern axiom that first and foremost individuals own themselves.
Perhaps it is time to introduce the antiphonal phrase possessive collectivism to
capture the notion that (indigenous) groups possess one thing above all others:
their culture. Indeed, at one level, the group is the culture, the origins of which are
presumed to be ancient and the existence of which is treated as timeless—an ideo-
logical convenience within what has come to be known in anthropological circles
as the politics of tradition. This well-known strategy can apply creatively to much
more than the canonically authentic parts of indigenous cultures. After the release
of the film based on his novella Whale Rider, writer and leading figure of the con-
temporary Ma¯ori cultural renaissance Witi Ihimaera stated that he took “a tribal
approach to writing.”He continued, “I would much prefer that I was better known
as a person who has helped the entire Ma¯ori literary tradition rather than my own
career.”20
It is as if, rather than individuals owning cultures (or bits of cultures), their
cultures possess them. There is a clear analogy between this idea of people being
owned by their cultures and indigenous rhetorics surrounding land and other parts
of the (natural) environment. I have heard, for example, some Ma¯ori assert that
their land owns them, rather than the other way around. Land and culture in this
respect are both conceptualized (culturally, of course) as inalienable.
If, as in some indigenous perspectives, no temporal limits are applied to curtail
ownership (and of course it is only cultural convention that requires such curtail-
ment), the ownership of nature and the ownership of culture are placed on the
same footing. In short, for practical purposes, culture and nature merge. In some
versions of this argument, it was only Western thought that ever conceived of sep-
arating them in the first place.
THE SEABED AND FORESHORE CONTROVERSY:
NATURAL INJUSTICE?
Consider a case study of particular significance to New Zealand in the opening
years of the twenty-first century. The recent and ongoing seabed and foreshore
dispute reveals legal and historical divisions, but it also sheds light on some deep-
seated cultural splits. Because it has generated a storm of commentary from al-
most every conceivable viewpoint, I can only scratch the surface.21
The controversy came to a head in 2004 when Ma¯ori from around New Zea-
land marched and mobilized against the Labour government’s move to pass leg-
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islation denying Ma¯ori groups the right to subject claims for seabed and foreshore
ownership rights to legal arbitration. This action effectively deprived Ma¯ori of a
natural avenue of justice to test their legal rights. The government’s course of ac-
tion was dictated by what it saw as the political unacceptability of an outcome in
which segments of the New Zealand coastline, previously deemed public domain,
could be ruled to be the freehold property of tribal or subtribal groups. Never
mind that by some estimates a third of the coastline is already in private hands
and will never be returned to public ownership. At one level the move was simply
racist oppression of a minority for reasons of realpolitik. At another level, how-
ever, the cultural grounds on which the political unacceptability rested were real
and deserve some scrutiny.
So how does the seabed and foreshore controversy relate to the theoretical me-
anderings earlier in the article? Land, seabed, and foreshore are always subject to
claims of exclusive ownership, but as an iconic identity marker the foreshore is
never owned exclusively.
Let me quickly clarify two aspects of this assertion. First, as the Court of Appeal
legal decision suggests,22 areas of seabed and foreshore are subject to rules and
laws of land tenure, not marine tenure. It is my understanding that issues of water
ownership are not at stake; those issues affect the land under and next to it, even
though the areas in question are clearly defined in relation to bodies of water.
Whether it is a matter of land or sea or both may be one issue where cultural
differences are most accentuated, however, since some Ma¯ori groups have not only
lodged claims to the customary ownership of water courses and marine resources
but have also resisted certain development projects on the grounds that they would
lead to the inappropriate mixing of waters from two different sources.23 This is an
argument clearly analogous to the opposition to genetic tinkering alluded to earlier.
Second, from a non-Ma¯ori perspective, the political storm surrounding the sea-
bed and foreshore issue stems from a fear fanned by populist politicians: Allowing
Ma¯ori groups to assert ownership of these pieces of land would prevent the rest of
society from gaining access to beaches. In this version of the white New Zealand
imaginary, bits of foreshore may be for private use but beaches are for everyone.
The beach (as it is often called) represents a complex myth composed of freedom
(from work, convention, clothes), access to fishing and other nautical pursuits,
and nostalgia for the great New Zealand summer holiday. (Bruce Mason’s play,
The End of the Golden Weather, which he performed as a one-man show at pos-
sibly every New Zealand school in the 1960s, is the ur-text for this myth.) The
difficulty is that the Pa¯keha¯ beach (or its mythology) is threatened by many sources,
not just Ma¯ori claims—in fact probably less from Ma¯ori reassertion of customary
ownership than from land sales to foreign and local developers for seaside resorts,
golf courses, and private paradises. One aspect of the old mythology rested on the
availability of coastal camping grounds for cheap holidays. As the owners of the
land on which many traditional camping grounds were located have sold it off to
private homeowners and developers (such land having appreciated greatly in value
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in the last few years), in early 2006, the then Labour-led government even floated
the quixotic idea of setting up new camping facilities on public land, allowing
bidding for suitable sites as they come on to the market.24
In the 2005 election campaign, the National Party almost wrested power from
the Labour party by appealing to voters with an advertising campaign that was
widely regarded as more successful than that of the incumbent government. The
most effective part of that campaign was a series of billboards attributing a mes-
sage to Labour in the left half of the billboard against a red background and the
National riposte in the right half of the billboard against a blue background. (By
historical convention, eerily echoed in the regalia of youth gangs based on the
Bloods and Crips division borrowed from Los Angeles gangster culture, red and
blue are in fact their respective colors.) Portraits of the two party leaders in their
particular billboard halves made the messages even clearer. The most effective bill-
boards were among the simplest and earliest erected. One placed the caption TAX
on the Labour side and the caption CUT on the National side. Enough said. An-
other, more germane to my topic, also juxtaposed the words IWI and KIWI under
a heading BEACHES that straddled the entire billboard. Iwi is a widely used term
for Ma¯ori tribal groupings; Kiwi is the Ma¯ori name for a native species of flight-
less bird as well as an unofficial term for a New Zealander. For various reasons
many people who object to the label Pa¯keha¯ readily embrace Kiwi, perhaps be-
cause Kiwi can theoretically apply to someone of any ethnicity, and the argument
that “we are all New Zealanders” (i.e., without regard to race) is popular. In prac-
tice, however, the name is often understood as applying to mainstream or non-
Ma¯ori New Zealand. I believe that was the tacit meaning behind the billboard:
Labour made (or would make) special interest deals with Ma¯ori iwi that deprived
ordinary New Zealanders of a right that made them New Zealanders.
Labour tried to forestall such a political reaction by passing the aforementioned
legislation, but as the party that had long claimed a special relationship to Ma¯ori
(and had won all seven Ma¯ori seats in the previous election), it was vulnerable to
the changing terms of the race debate. In the 2005 election, caught in a squeeze
between National’s populist campaigning and more radical Ma¯ori policies, La-
bour retained three seats but lost four to a new Ma¯ori Party, whose coleader had
defected from Labour largely because of Labour’s stance on the foreshore and sea-
bed issue.
The foreshore and seabed dispute derives much of its ferocity from an ongoing
tension in New Zealand political discourse between, on one hand, privatization/
private ownership and control and, on the other hand, ideologies of collectivism
and the common good. I can only give a taste of the historical complexities here,
but they are strongly shaped by two currents of legal precedent. The first is a pop-
ular discourse taken from British law and Western political ideology that high-
lights the need to protect public access to the commons. The second is a discourse
concerned with protecting specific treaty rights pertaining to indigenous peoples.
At the risk of oversimplification, the former focuses on class, the latter on culture.
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The colonial connection is responsible for both. That is to say, settlers introduced
a Western-style system of classes with all the conflict such a system presupposes,
while the Treaty of Waitangi reflected longstanding imperial doctrines concerning
the proper treatment of the native populations. Said doctrines attempted to main-
tain a delicate balance between indigenous ideas of property and hierarchy and
introduced ideas of property that animated class and class conflict.
The mythology of rights that stem from the British common law tradition (the
Queen’s chain, “an Englishman’s home is his castle,” etc.) remain powerful in New
Zealand. But they are inevitably inflected and deflected by the influence of Ma¯ori
notions of ownership and guardianship, disputes over dispossession, extinction of
land rights under colonialism, and redress through the Treaty of Waitangi and
courts (including Ma¯ori land courts).
Class is the defining principle of property in Britain. The right to walk in the
countryside is the assertion of a class right against upper class landowners. Trans-
ferred to New Zealand, this principle lent a powerful impetus to the actual breakup
of large run-holdings in the North Island toward the end of the nineteenth cen-
tury. This continues in the present day by means of a program of revising the
terms of large leasehold properties in the South Island high country. But those
changes in ownership disadvantaged only a minority of the settler population,
whose rights have never been the focus of widespread political support. As such,
there are precedents in British history in the form of progressive tax regimes, oc-
casional nationalization of resources, and the steady erosion of aristocratic
privilege—most of which apply or have been tested in New Zealand. In some New
Zealand contexts, however, the notion of property has become culturalized to a
much larger extent than in the mother country. In the latter the development of
property law has largely eclipsed and certainly takes precedence over what might
be called prior forms of property. The matter is not so settled in New Zealand
where, through the treaty settlement process, ostensibly Crown property (includ-
ing the foreshore and seabed) is subject to claims from groups who do not rep-
resent the majority of individual citizens. As a consequence the foreshore and seabed
issue revolves around the very definition of property. Is it individual or collective,
alienable or inalienable? These are more than matters of class-based distributive
justice; rather, they shape the creation and/or recognition of historically and cul-
turally differentiated groups within society.
Ironies abound. The New Zealand debate over the foreshore and seabed in ef-
fect opposes those who wish to apply an individualist concern for property rights
(but safeguarded by the state that allows some unrestricted public access to beaches)
to those who wish to apply rights based on descent that are reminiscent of the
aristocratic rights that have been constrained in Britain! A recognized authority
on the history of New Zealand identity and race relations supports my argument:
“One of the essences of Pa¯keha¯ New Zealandness is the notion that cer-
tain resources are freely available to all people,” says University of Auck-
land historian James Belich. The condition is deeply rooted in the 19th
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Century, when settlers came from Britain, where the lower classes were
not entitled to hunt, fish, or have leisure. “There is a deep-seated nerve
being drummed here. Whether it’s been done deliberately or reasonably
is another matter,” Belich says.25
At least one religious studies expert has described the controversy as an in-
stance of “landscape paganism.” According to Mike Grimshaw of the University of
Canterbury, “The seabed-and-foreshore thing was a religious debate, about the
beaches being sacred spaces that bind us together and split us apart.”26 Ironically,
the people he had in mind as adherents of this new religion are almost certainly
Pa¯keha¯.
CULTURALLY DIFFERENT IDEAS OF PROPERTY?
The final part of this article returns briefly to the question of the extent to which
there really are culturally different ideas of property in New Zealand or indeed
elsewhere. As noted in the introduction, AndrewMoutu picks up onMarilyn Strath-
ern’s assertion that in many parts of Melanesia land can be conceived as a kind of
intellectual property. On this view intellectual property is real property (as in the
real of real estate), a conceptual move made possible by means of a dialectical flip
from seeing ownership functioning as a “technology to enhance and stimulate fur-
ther creativity” to seeing creativity functioning as a “technology that perpetuates
ownership.”27 In so saying, both authors question what Strathern calls the West-
ern distinction between tangible and intangible property. More importantly, the
argument she proposes, and Moutu elaborates through his case study of the own-
ership of an oxbow lake in the Sepik River system, also questions the distinction
between entitlements based on the productivity of human labor and entitlements
based on intellectual activity. Of course, at least one Western philosophical tradi-
tion, Marxism, has long questioned that distinction, but it has done so by sub-
suming intellectual labor within (nonalienated) productive labor. For Marx value
was created by labor, and property relations should reflect that fact—a theory that
the Sepik clan members seemed to reject when they explained their views to Moutu.
For them, the crucial right has less to do with how much work people put into the
creation of an oxbow lake than whether they have the right to work on its creation
on the first place.
Nevertheless, in this generally fruitful and stimulating reconceptualization of
cultural difference, it would be unwise to regardWestern cultural systems of prop-
erty as monolithic. The existence of a Marxist tradition unsettles the notion of a
capitalist cultural system, however hegemonic that system has become, and we
should note that the labor theory of value was itself a reaction to an earlier phys-
iocratic theory of economy. Developed in the seventeenth century under the pa-
tronage of the French monarchy (with its real interests in real property), this theory
maintained that land and agriculture were the real source of real value. It also
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placed this value system at the basis of the natural order, which is to say the cul-
tural order with its culturalness camouflaged. Now, according to Moutu, Strath-
ern acknowledges eighteenth-century British views comparing intellectual property
to the activity of tilling the soil, but in terms of her overall argument, this seems
to be an afterthought. The Melanesian view of property may turn out to be much
closer to the physiocratic one than the bulk of Strathern’s work on non-Western
systems of property and personhood otherwise recognizes.
The question, then, is not just who owns nature or culture, in part or in whole,
but who has the right to define which of these is which and how much of each is
ownable. The answers to those questions are partly matters of culture, but the
cultural values in question are shaped by a multitude of other factors: legal tradi-
tions, historical changes in production, claims of class allegiance, and (in the case
of the New Zealand foreshore and seabed dispute) relations of power in colonial
societies.
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